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THE APPLICATION OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
TO THE INTANGIBLE.
The Federal Constitution confers upon Congress power
"to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the
several States," etc. The difficulty and uncertainty involved
in the application of this important provision seem to have
largely resulted from vagueness of conception of the precise
scope of the word commerce. For reasons that will .pres-
ently appear, I am inclined to thing that its use in this con-
nection was unfortunate; that the word transportation would
have been preferable.
Etymologically it is based on the Latin word "merx," de-
fined as "goods, wares, commodities, merchandise," and
commerce itself has been defined as "interchange of goods,
merchandise, or property of any kind."'  Goods have been
defined as "movable effects or personal chattels; articles of
portable property, as distinguished from money, lands, build-
ings, ships, rights in action, etc., as household goods;"2
so merchandise as "any movable object of trade or traffic;
that which is passed from hand to hand by purchase and
sale."3 Property is undoubtedly a broader term, yet it has
been defined as "ownership; estates; especially, ownership of
tangible things," and has been said to be "the general word
for those material things which are one's own, whether for
sale or not."'
It will, I think, be undisputed that these words "goods,"
"merchandise," "property" primarily and naturally suggest
the tangible, such as furniture, clothing, cattle, and so on,
rather than the intangible. And undoubtedly, at the time of
"Century Dictionary.
2Id.
'Id..
Old.
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the adoption of the Constitution, and for a long time there-
after, the word commerce usually suggested no conception
of what is not tangible. It then, as perhaps it does even now,
conspicuously brought to mind vessels and their cargoes.
This early limitation of conception seems to me to survive
in the defitition most approved by the Supreme Court.
"Commerce with foreign countries and among the States,
strictly considered, consists in intercourse and traffic, includ-
ing in these terms navigation and the transportation and
transit of persons and property, as well as the purchase, sale,
and exchange of commodities."'  It is also said: "Com-
merce among the States embraces navigation, intercourse,
communication, traffic, the transit of persons, and the trans-
mission of messages by telegraph."6  Scarcely an improve-
ment seems the following statement, which rather indicates
an increasing confusion of conception: "Let us inquire what
is commerce, the power to regulate which is given to Con-
gress? The question has been frequently propounded in
this court, and the answer has been-and no more specific
ans-er could well have been given-that commerce among
the several States comprehends traffic, intercourse, trade,
navigation, communication, the transit of persons and the
transmission of messages by telegraph." T A sorry con-
clusion, indeed, I say, if it be really true that "no more
specific answer" can be given! But I hope to make it clear
that the situation is, after all, not so discouraging.
Let us .revert to the definition that I have referred to
as the one most approved by the Supreme Court. It seems
to me a most unfortunate one, as inadequate and misleading,
It will presently appear that, in tle opinion of the Supreme
Court, at least, commerce but partially and imperfectly
comprehends intercourse. And it scarcely seems to need
' County of Mobile v. Kimball, i02 U. S. 691, 702 (Oct. 8S0). This
was approvingly quoted in McCall v. California, 136 U. S. zo4 (189o);
Williams v. Fears, 179 U. S. 270 (i9oo); Champion v. Ames, 188 U. S.
321, 351 (9o3).
"Champion v. Ames, supra.
'Adair v. U. S., 2o8 U. S. x6x, 176 (i9o8).
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pointing out that it does not comprehend mere traffic as
such at all, or "the purchase, sale, and exchange of com-
modities." These are of themselves merely internal trans-
actions, and the power of Congress does not extend to "that
commerce, which is completely internal, which is carried on
between man and man in a State, or between different
parts of the same State, and which does not extend to or
affect other States."
All then that really remains of the definition is that com-
merce consists in "the transportation of persons and prop-
erty" (the words "and transit" being omitted as superflu-
ous). For present purposes, we may ignore the transporta-
tion of persons, and simply define commerce as "the trans-
portation of property." From the standpoint of the earlier
conception already discussed, we may change this to "the
transportation of tangible property." But even the use of
tie word property seems objectionable as involving an un-
necessary limitation; for does not the commerce clause
apply to the transportation of what is the property of no
one, unless in a very qualified sense, such as ferocious and
noxious wild beasts? The same may be said of refuse
matter, such as garbage.
So then, still viewing the matter from the standpoint of
the earlier conception, we have as a definition of commerce,
"the transportatiou of the tangible." It is my particular
object to consider the application and extension of this defin-
ition to the intangible.
From a strictly scientific or philosophical standpoint, the
distinction between the tangible and the intangible may not
be a radical one, though undoubtedly there is a sufficiently
clear practical distinction between what is "capable of being
touched or grasped, or of affecting the sense of touch ;" and
what is "incapable of being touched; not susceptible to the
touch." It is true that when the occasion arose, the appli-
'For instance, in N. Y. ex rel. Hatch v. Rtardon, 2o4 U. S. x52
(rq97), the commerce clause was held not to apply to a mere sale of
stock a
IEmployers' Liabily CaSes, 20713. S. 463, 493 (1908).
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cation of the commerce clause to the intangible was readily
enough recognized by the Supreme Court, but such recogni-
tion was partial and limited, by reason of the continuing
influence of the earlier conception.
In Gibbons v. Ogden, Johnson, J., speaking perhaps some-
what in advance of his time, said that while "commerce,
in its simplest signification, means an exchange, of goods,"
"in the advancement of society, labor, transportation, intelli-
gence, care, and various mediums of exchange become com-
modities, and enter into commerce.""0 But the application
of the commerce clause to the intangible was first conspicu-
ously recognized in the case of transmission of messages
by the electric telegraph. Thus in Pensacola Tel. Co. v.
Western Union Tel. Co,11 where it was declared to be "not
only the right, but the duty, of Congress to see to it that
intercourse among the States and the transmission of intel-
ligence are not obstructed or unnecessarily encumbered by
State legislation." So, too, in Western Union Tel. Co. v.
Pendletol,12 where it was said of "intercourse by telegraphic
messages:" "It differs in material particulars from that
portion of commerce with foreign countries and between the
States which consists in the carriage of persons and the
transportation and exchange of commodities, upon which
we have been so often called to pass. It differs not only
in the subjects which it transmits, but in the means of trans-
mission. Other commerce deals only with persons, or with
visible and tangible things. But the telegraph transports
nothing visible and tangible; it carries only ideas, wishes,
orders, and intelligence."
In its general aspects, communication by telephone so
closely resembles communication by telegraph that the appli-
cation of the commerce. clause to the former was readily
recognized. 3 Nor does there seem any reason to doubt
U9 Wheat. x, 29 (1824).
'96 U. S. x (Oct. 187).
" 122 U. S. 347, 356 (1887).
" See Central Union Tel. Co. v. State, 18 Ind. 194 ('889); Matter
of Pennsylvania Tel. Co. 48 N. J. Eq. 91 (i89); Muskogee Tel. Co.
v. Hall, x8 Fed. 382 (C. C.A. 8th C. i9o2).
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that it is likewise applicable to communication by means of
undulations of the luminiferous ether, without the assist-
ance of a wire; that is, by wireless telegraph. And is
not the same true of communication by means of undulations
of the atmosphere; that is to say, by the use of the human
voice in conversation, thus between persons situated at the
time on opposite sides of a State boundary?
Now does it make any difference that such transportation
of the intangible operates as a means of negotiation of a con-
tract? It seems hard to see what rational basis of dis-
tinction there is in this respect. In determining the appli-
cation of the commerce clause to communication by tele-
graph, has it ever been seriously considered whether tele-
grams should be classified as, so to speak, contractual or
non-contractual; that is, with regard to whether a given
telegram operates as a means of negotiation of a contract?
The distinction, as thus applied, would, I think, be instinc-
tively and generally regarded as absurd, to say nothing of
the enormous practical difficulty of applying it. Neverthe-
less, we shall, I think, presently see that some such dis-
tinction has been solemnly established by the Supreme Court,
by way of excluding from the application of the commerce
clause, the intangible, if operating as a means of negotiation
of a contract.
Some eight years after such application to the intang-
ible had been so clearly recognized in Western Union Tel.
Co. v. Pendleton, the following situation was presented in
Hooper v. California.14 Insurance brokers doing business
in New York had an agent located in California, of whom
inquiry was there made if he could procure insurance on a
vessel. He communicated with his principals, requesting
them to advise him of what, if anything, they had done or
could do in the premises. Thereupon they sent a telegram,
that is, from New York to California, containing informa-
tion to the effect that insurance had been placed on the
vessel, and the contents of the telegram were communicated
155s U. S. 64 (1895).
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to the applicant. Thereafter the principals forwarded to the
agent, that is, from New York to California, a policy issued
by a 'Massachusetts corporation, and this was delivered
to the applicant. The premium was paid, and the principals
were informed by the agent that it had been collected and
the amount deposited to their credit. The question for
decision was whether the commerce clause was applicable,
so as to preclude the application of State legislation.
In the light of our preceding discussion, the answer
seems clear enough, as a matter of principle; so at any rate
it seems to me. In Pensacola Tel. Co. v. Western Union
Tel. Co. the commerce clause had been held applicable to
"intercourse among the States and the transmission of in-
telligence ;" in Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pendleton to the
transportation of what is not "visible and tangible;" of
"ideas, wishes, orders, and intelligence." And certainly
these elements were present in the situation involved in
Hooper v. California, whether we have in view the request
sent by the agent from California to New York that the
principals advise him of what they had done or could do, or
the information sent by the principals from New York to
California, to the effect that insurance had been placed.
Furthermore, there was the employment of a telegraphic
message, a circumstance that, strangely enough, it seems to
me, the court entirely overlooked or ignored. And there
was the transmission from New York to California of the
policy, which certainly fell within the description of the
tangible. 15
Nevertheless, surprising as it may appear, the court con-
cluded that the commerce clause was inapplicable, at any
rate, for the purpose of precluding the application of State
legislation. Neither the prevailing nor the dissenting opinion
reveals any consciousness that the court had already decided
that the commerce clause does apply to "intercourse among
"On this point the decision is, I submit, absolutely irreconcilable'
with Champion v. Ames, IM8 U. S. 32! (1903), holding the commerce
clause applicable to the transportation of a lottery ticket. This is
made clear in the dissenting opinion in Champion v. Ames.
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the States and the transmission of intelligence ;" to the trans-
portation of what is not "visible and tangible;- of "ideas,
wishes, orders, and intelligence."
The explanation of this phenomenon appears to be that
the court, whether consciously or unconsciously, re-erted
to the earlier conception of commerce as limited to the
transportation of the tangible. This is, I think, made clear
by the reliance on the following reasoning employed in
paut v. Virginia:'" "Issuing a policy of insurance is not a
transaction'of commerce. The policies are simple contracts
of indemnity against loss by fire, entered into between the
corporations and the assured, for a consideration paid by
the latter. These contracts are not articles of commerce in
any proper sense of the word. They are not subjects of
trade and barter offered in the market as something having
an existence and value independent of the parties to them.
They are not commodities to be shipped or forwarded from
one State to another, and then put up for sale." Continuing
the court said: "The business of insurance is not commerce.
The contract of insurance is not an instrumentality of com-
merce. The making of such a contract is a mere incident
of commercial intercourse." The distinction thus stated is
one that I confess my inability to comprehend.
The court has steadfastly adhered to the doctrine thus
announced in Paul z,. Virginia,"7 and it must now be- re-
garded as a merely academic question whether the commerce
clause is applicable to the mere negotiation of a contract
between persons situated at the time in different States.
Thus, in Ware v. Mobile County,18 it was held inapplicable
to such contracts for the sale of grain or cotton. This was
the case of brokers taking orders and transmitting them to
other States. The performance of the contract involved,
however, no transportation from one State to another. That
"8 WaIL x68 (Dee. 1868).
"For decisions since Hooper v. California see Noble v. Mitchell,
164 U. S. 367 (x896); N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Cravens, 178 U. S. 389,
4oz (igoo); Nutting v. Massachusetts, x83 U. S. 553 (9o2).
ig209 U. S. 405 (108).
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is to say, a part of the transactions were "merely specula-
tive and followed by no actual delivery," and in case of
such.as did, the property was bought in the State to which
the order was transmitted and there held for the purchaser.
"In neither class of contracts, for sale or'purchase, was there
necessarily any movement of commodities in interstate traf-
fic, because of the contracts made by the brokers." Thedoc-
trine of Paid v. Virginia was expressly applied, the court
saying: "Contracts between citizens of different States are
not the subjects of interstate commerce, simply because they
are negotiated between citizens of different States, or by the
agent of a company in another State, where the contract
itself is to be completed and carried out wholly within the
borders of a Sfate, although such contracts incidentally af-
fect interstate trade."
Nevertheless, it was clearly recognized in Ware v. Mobile
County that a contract negotiated between persons situated
at the time in different States may be within the scope of
the commerce clause, by reason of being incidental to what
is within its scope. Thus, as here said, "the negotiation of
sales of goods in a State by a person employed to solicit for
them in another State, the goods to be shipped from the
one State to the other, is interstate commerce." An illus-
tration is furnished by Rearick v. Pennsylvania,"9 where an
agent of a corporation located in Ohio negotiated in Penn-
sylvania with persons there situated, contracts for the sale
of groceries, which were thereafter transported from Ohio
to Pennsylvania. That is to say, a contract negotiated be-
tween persons situated at the time in different States,
though not of itself within the scope of the commerce
clause, was so by reason of being incidental to what was
within its scope.
As applicable to the tangible generally, the principle thus
stated is too well established to call for extended discus-
sio.
20
2203 U. S. o' (x9o6).
"Nevertheless it seems to me to have been overlooked or ignored
in Williams v. Fears, 179 U. S. 270 (xgoo), where the commerce
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But suppose that this Ohio corporation had been engaged
in the business of furnishing means of communication by
telegraph or telephone between Ohio and Pennsylvania, or
even by wireless telegraph. Would not the negotiation of
a contract to be performed by furnishing such means of
communication have been equally within the scope of the
commerce clause? So far as I can see, it would.
This brings us to a consideration of the important dis-
tinction between the negotiation and the performance of a
contract, with reference to the application of the commerce
clause to the intangible. We have seen that while such
application does not extend to the mere negotiation of a
contract, it may extend thereto by reason of its being inci-
dental to what is within the scope of the commerce clause.
This is so as to a contract the performance of which involves
the transportation of the tangible. Is the same true of one
the performance of which involves the transportation of the
intangible?
I submit that it is. We have seen it to be established that,
to an extent at least, the commerce clause does apply to
transportation of the intangible; that is. to "intercourse
among the States and the transmission of intelligence"; to
the transportation of what is not "visible and tangible";
of "ideas, wishes, orders, and intelligence." To the extent
that the performance of a contract involves such transpor-
tation of the intangible, I submit that the commerce clause
is applicable thereto.
The point remains to be passed upon by the Supreme
Court, but the courts that have had occasion to do so have
mainfested a decided inclination to deny the application of
the commerce clause to this class of cases, this being, as it
seems to me, a result of failure to apprehend such distinc-
tion between the ne.qotiation and the performance of the con-
tract
clause was held inapplicable to the business of hiring laborers "to be
employed beyond the limits of the State." though concededly "trans-
portation must eventually take place as the result of such contracts."
Here again it was Paul v. Virginia that proved misleading.
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In International Text-book Co. v. Pcterson1 were in-
volved the transactions of a corporation located in Penn-
sylvania, the owner and proprietor of what are known as
"International Correspondence Schools," its business be-
ing that of furnishing instruction by correspondence. It
entered into a contract with a person in Wisconsin, such
contract to be performed in the manner thus described:
"The plaintiff was to send to the defendant by mail or ex-
press from Scranton, Pa., to Manitowoc, Wis., a first set
of instruction papers, examination questions, and drawing
plates pertaining to a course of instruction in the themistry
and manufacture of leather scholarship; defendant on re-
ceipt of these was to study the same, write out his work,
and forward it to the plaintiff at Scranton, Pa., by mail,
together with such questions or inquiries as he might need
to make relative to the work; the plaintiff.by its instructors,
teachers, and correspondence clerks would thereupon correct
the work of the defendant upon its receipt at Scranton, Pa.,
and return it to the defendant at Manitowoc, Wis., by mail,
together with answers to his questions or inquiries, and to-
gether with a further set of copyrighted instruction papers,
examination questions, and drawing plates; defendant- was
thereupon to take up this second set of papers, work upon
them as before, and return his work to Scranton, Pa., in
the manner above described, for correction; this process
was to continue until defendant had received from plaintiff
all the copyrighted instruction papers, examination ques-
tions, and drawing plates contracted for by defendant's ac-
cepted application above described; at the time the first set
of copyrighted instruction papers, examination questions,
and drawing plates were to be sent by the plaintiff to the de-
fendant, the plaintiff was also to send to the defendant a
set of bound volumes, the title thereto remaining in plain-
tiff, to be loaned to the defendant during such time as he
made no default on his contract obligations."
I leave out of consideration the circumstance that the
133 Wis. 302 (1907).
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performance of the contract pretty clearly involved trans-
portation of the tangible; that is to say, of the instruction
papers, examination questions, and drawing plates. I am
utterly unable to see why this was not of itself sufficient to
make the commerce clause applicable. The court disposed,
however, of this point on the ground that this was "a con-
tract with the defendant, domiciled in Wisconsin, which
included only incidentally the transfer of articles of prop-
erty by the usual transportation agencies from Pennsylvania
to Wisconsin, and consisted mainly in an obligation to fur-
nish, by such usual transportation agencies, the defendant
in Wisconsin, from the domicile of the plaintiff in Penn-
sylvania, instruction or information continuously for a
considerable period of time. The few and incidental articles
of property furnished were not objects of sale, barter, or
exchange, but instrumentalities through which .the plain-
tiff imparted its instruction."
The court applied the doctrine of Paul v. Virginia and
Hooper v. California, already considered, saying: "The de-
cisions of the Supreme Court of the United States with
reference to policies of insurance, and more particularly
the reasons upon which these decisions are based, seem to
exclude from the domain of interstate commerce the con-
tract and transactions in the case at bar. * * * These
cases lead us to believe in the existence of a tentative rule,
which, while it does not stretch very far into the domain
of commerce, still comprehends the contract in question, be-
cause that contract concerns something not a subject of
trade or barter having an existence or value independent of
the parties to the contract, and is like the insurance policy,
'not an instrumentality of commerce, but a mere incident of
commercial intercourse.'"
. In view of what has already been said, the fallacy of such
a conclusion scarcely needs, I think, to be pointed out It
must be admitted that the commerce clause is not applica-
ble to a mere contract between persons situated at the time
in different States, to furnish instruction by correspondence.
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But this is because the performance of the contract does not
necessarily involve transportation from one State to another,
any more than does the performance of a contract of insur-
ance, though one between persons situated in different States.
In the case under consideration the dealings constituting
performance of the contract, instead of being between
Scranton, Pa., and Manitowoc, Wis., might well have. been
between Milwaukee, Wis., and Manitowoc, Wis. Oii that
suppgsition the case would have been like that under consid-
eration in Ware v. Mobile County. But, as it was, the per-
formance of the contract clearly involved transportation
from Pennsylvania to Wisconsin.
The same corporation and substantially the same course
of dealing were under consideration in International Text-
book Co. v. Inhabitants of Auburn,22 and in International
Text-book Co. v. Lynch."  In the former the com-
merce clause was, on another ground, held inapplicable,
but the court said: "The complainant claims that this is in-
terstate commerce, a definition which may well be doubted.
We may well question whether the mere occupation of giv-
ing instruction can be commerce, and whether, therefore, as
the main purpose must be classified as noncommercial, the
incidents thereof must not also be classified in the same
way." In the other case, the same result was reached as
by the Wisconsin court, reference being made to the rule as
applied in Paul v. Virginia. and Hooper v. California, but
here there was regarded as involved a distinct consideration
thus stated: "The transportation of letters and printed mat-
ter of all kinds is regulated by the postal laws of the coun-
try and not by the laws of interstate commerce. The obstruc-
tion of commerce and of the mails are offenses referred to
and treated by the Supreme Court as controlled by sepa-
rate and distinct laws."
In State v. Morgan,24 were involved the transactions of
" 15 Fed. 986 (C. C. Me. 1907).
181 Vt. 101 (x108).
"2 S. D. 32, 53 (189).
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a mercantile agency doing business at Chicago, New York,
and other points outside of South Dakota, in which State
a person acted as special agent, transmitting information to
his employers. In holding the commerce clause inapplica-
ble, the court said: "The business is merely a bureau of
information, acting as the agent of its employers, and its
object is to collect and impart information to those who
pay for it. It is true that this information may be confined
within the limits of the State, or it -may cross State lines,
both in its collection and its dissemination, but for this rea-
son it cannot be called interstate commerce. * * * Infor-
mation or intelligence is not an article of 'commerce' in
any troper meaning of that word. Neither are they sub-
jects of trade and barter, offered in the market as some-
thing having an existence and value independent of the par-
ties to them. Neither are they commodities, to be shipped
or forwarded from one State to another, and there put up
for sale. The information furnished by mercantile agencies
to subscribers of their rating books is like other personal
contracts between parties. It is individual in its character,
and has no relation to the general public. The mercantile
agency is not a common carrier. It is no intermediate in-
strument to disseminate its information, but it is a col-
lecter, storer, and holder of it, to be given directly to those
who wish to purchase or pay for it. The telegraph, the
steamboat, and railroads are instruments of commerce, be-
cause it is by their instrumentality that articles and com-
modities are purchased, exchanged, and carried from one
country or State to another. The telegraph and post office
transmit the order from the purchaser to the seller; the
steamboat and railway carry and deliver the goods and arti-
cles from the seller to the purchaser. A mercantile agency
does neither. As well say that the ship builder, by whose
skill and money a ship or steamboat is floated on river, lake
or ocean; the mechanic, whose labor constructs, or the en-
gineer, who runs the engine or car upon the railroad; the
operator who sends the message upon the wire,-are instru-
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ments of commerce, and properly coming within the clause
of the United States Constitution regulating interstate com-
merce. The business, as conducted by mercantile agencies,
may be an adjunct of commerce and of commercial transac-
tions, but it is a separate and distinct appliance, and does
not come within the principles of law which govern or reg-
ulate either of them."
In view of what has already been said, it seems unneces-
sary to discuss this decision in detail, and show how the rea-
soning therein is permeated with the conception of com-
merce as limited to the transportation of the tangible. I
call attention, however, to what may be an unduly narrow
conception of its application to communication by telegraph.
It surely is untrue that it has such application only where
by the instrumentality of the telegraph "articles and com-
modities are purchased, exchanged, and carried from one
country or State to another." When in Western Union Tel.
Co. v. Pendleton, a State statute regulating the delivery of
telegrams was held inapplicable to telegrams sent to another
State, there was certainly involved no implication that the
rule is otherwise in a case where there is no purchase, ex-
change or carriage of "articles" or "commodities".
The results of the preceding discussion may thus be sum-
marily stated. From the standpoint of the earlier concep-
tion of the word "commerce," as used in the commerce
clause, we have, as a definition thereof, "the transportation
of the tangible." Such definition came indeed to be applied
to the intangible also, conspicuously so to communication by
telegraph. Yet such application was but partial and limited,
by reason of the continuing influence of the earlier concep-
tion. Thus, it is still refused application to the mere nego-
tiation of a contract between persons situated at the time in
different States, conspicuously so as to contracts of insur-
ance. But it is allowed application to such negotiation, by
reason of its being incidental to what is within the scope of
the commerce clause-thus, where performance of the con-
tract involves transportation of the intangible. It is sub-
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mitted that it likewise has such application where such per-
formance involves transportation of the intangible, bitt thus
far it has been denied such application, especially with respect
to contracts to furnish instruction by correspondence.
Fred'k. H. Cooke.
52 William street, New York City.
